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Austin Roche

KIMBLE V. MARVEL ENTERTAINMENT, LLC:
ECONOMIC ARGUMENT DEFEATED;
SUPERPOWERED STARE DECISIS PREVAILS

In Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC1, the issue presented to the Supreme Court
was whether it should overrule its decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co.,2 which held that a
patentee cannot receive royalty payments after the term of the patent has expired.3
The Court held that under stare decisis it must uphold the Brulotte ruling.4 The Court
ruled correctly by upholding a ruling on statutory interpretation that Congress had
left unchanged for over half a century.5 The dissent’s inaccurate argument that the
Brulotte ruling was actually bad policymaking is not enough to overcome the
powerful force of stare decisis.6
I. THE CASE

In 1990, Stephen Kimble invented a Spider-Man toy that allowed its user to spray
foam string by pulling a trigger, thus imitating Spider-Man’s ability to shoot a
spider’s web.7 Kimble patented the toy idea under U.S. Patent No. 5,072,856, which
expired on May 25, 2010.8 Kimble met with a Marvel representative in 1990 to discuss
his ideas regarding the patent.9 He contends that during this meeting, the
representative told him that Marvel would compensate him if it used any of his

© 2017 Austin Roche

J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, 2017.
1.
135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015).
2.
379 U.S. 29 (1964).
3.
Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2405 (2015); Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964).
4.
Kimble, 135 S.Ct. at 2405.
5.
See infra Part IV.A.
6.
Id.
7.
Kimble v. Marvel Enterprises Inc., 727 F.3d 856, 857 (9th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Kimble v. Marvel
Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015).
8.
Id. at 858
9.
Id.
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ideas.10 Later, Marvel began manufacturing a similar Spider Man toy called the “Web
Blaster,” which would also allow its users to spray foam string by pulling a trigger.11
In 1997, Kimble brought suit against Marvel for patent infringement and breach
of contract, alleging that Marvel broke its verbal agreement with him by not
compensating him for using the ideas he disclosed at the 1990 meeting.12 The district
court granted Marvel’s motion for summary judgment on the patent infringement
claim, and a jury found in favor of Kimble on the contract claim.13The court awarded
Kimble 3.5% of past, present, and future Web Blaster net product sales in the contract
case.14
Kimble and Marvel agreed to settle these cases while the appeals were still pending
in 2001.15 The terms of the Agreement included that the parties would withdraw their
appeals, and that Marvel would purchase Kimble’s patent.16 The Purchase Agreement
stated that:
The purchase price for the Patent shall be payable to the Patent Holders as
follows:
a. $516,214.62 upon execution and delivery of this Agreement; and
b. 3% of “net product sales” (as such term is used in the Judgment) excluding
refill royalties made after December 31, 2000. For purposes of this paragraph
3.b, “net product sales” shall be deemed to include product sales that would
infringe the Patent but for the purchase and sale thereof pursuant to this
Agreement as well as sales of the Web Blaster product that was the subject of
the Action and to which the Judgment refers.17
There was no expiration date to the Agreement, and there was no limitation to
Marvel’s obligation to pay the 3% of net product sales.18
In 2006, after Marvel entered a licensing agreement with Hasbro regarding the
production of Marvel toys, including the Web Blaster, several disputes arose between
Kimble and Marvel concerning the royalty payments.19 Marvel counterclaimed and
10.

Id.
Id.
12.
Id.
13.
Id.
14.
Id.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
17.
Id. at 858-59.
18.
Id. at 859
19.
Id. (“A number of disagreements subsequently arose between Marvel and Kimble concerning the royalty
payments. These disputes revolved around the calculation of royalties for subsequent iterations of the Web Blaster
that included additional functions (in addition to shooting foam string) or Web Blasters that were packaged with
other role play items (such as Spider–Man masks).”)
11.
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sought a declaration that it was no longer obligated to pay Kimble the royalty
payments under the Settlement Agreement because the Web Blaster never infringed
on Kimble’s patent.20 The parties filed for summary judgment, and the United States
District Court for the District of Arizona referred to the Magistrate Judge for a
recommendation.21 The Magistrate Judge found that under Brulotte v. Thys Co.,22 the
royalty provision of the Settlement Agreement was unenforceable reasoning that “the
Settlement Agreement transferred patent rights, and that it was less clear that it
transferred any non-patent rights.”23 The district court adopted the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and ruled that Marvel was not required to pay royalties under the
Agreement after the patent expired on May 25th, 2010.24
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision, although it
admitted to reluctantly applying the Brulotte ruling, which it called “
counterintuitive” and “unconvincing.”25 Regardless, the Court conceded that Brulotte
is controlling and thus the Court was bound to follow it.26 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide whether it should overrule Brulotte.27
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC28 is a patent law case in which the Court’s
opinion relies heavily on the principle of stare decisis to decide whether it should
overrule another patent law case, Brulotte v. Thys Co. This section will provide
background on patent law,29 stare decisis,30 and the Court’s ruling in Brulotte.31
A. Patent Law
Under 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1), a patent holder is given exclusive rights to his or her
invention.32 The relevant parts of the Patent Act are as follows:
(a) In general.--

20.

Id.
Id.
22.
379 U.S. 29 (1964).
23.
Kimble, 727 F.3d at 859-60.
24.
Kimble v. Marvel Enterprises, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1162 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, 727 F.3d 856 (9th
Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015).
25.
Kimble, 727 F.3d at 857.
26.
Id. at 867.
27.
Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2405 (2015).
28.
135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015).
29.
See infra part II.A.
30.
See infra Part II.B.
31.
See infra Part II.C.
32.
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2015).
21.
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(1) Contents.--Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a
grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the
United States …
(2) Term.--Subject to the payment of fees under this title, such grant shall be
for a term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20
years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the
United States.33
The Act allows a patentee to sell the patent or license it for royalty payments.34
However, this right is subject to a twenty-year term which begins when the patentee
files the application to obtain the patent.35 Once this patent term expires, the patentee
no longer has the exclusive right to make and use the article free from restriction.36
The Supreme Court ruled in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.37 that “an article on
which the patent has expired,” like an unpatentable article, “is in the public domain
and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do so.”38 Additionally, the Court
has deemed unenforceable contract provisions that restrict the free use of
unpatentable articles and articles for which the patent has expired.39 The Court
reasoned in Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co.40 that “any attempted reservation or
continuation in the patentee . . . after the patent expires, whatever the legal device
employed, runs counter to the policy and purpose of the patent laws” and “would
deprive . . . the consuming public of the advantage to be derived” from the free use
of the article.41
B. Stare Decisis
Stare decisis, the principle that the court will stand by its previous decisions, has been
described by the Supreme Court as “a foundation stone of the rule of law, necessary
to ensure that legal rules develop ‘in a principled and intelligible fashion.’”42 “Stare
33.

35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)-(2) (2015).
Id.
35.
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2015).
36.
See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964).
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945) (ruling that a manufacturer could not
agree to refrain from challenging a patent’s validity).
40.
Id.
41.
Id. at 256; see also, e.g., Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394, 400–01 (1947)
(ruling that Scott Paper applies to licensees); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668–75 (1969) (refusing to enforce
a contract requiring a licensee to pay royalties while contesting a patent’s validity).
42.
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2036 (2014) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474
U.S. 254 (1986)).
34.
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decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and
consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”43 However,
stare decisis is not an “inexorable command” or a “mechanical formula,” but rather a
policy principle.44 The Court has reasoned that it is more important that the law be
settled than for it to be settled right.45 An argument that the Court ruled incorrectly
is not sufficient to overcome stare decisis, there must be some additional, special
justification that the precedent was wrongly decided.46
When the Court interprets a statute, stare decisis carries a greater force because any
disagreements with the interpretation can be settled by Congress, which has the
authority to create a new statute.47 In other words, if the Court has interpreted a
statute and Congress has not taken subsequent action to change the statute, the Court
assumes Congress agrees with the interpretation, which bolsters the idea that the
judicial interpretation was correct. Additionally, “considerations in favor of stare
decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights,” because
rulings in such cases are relied upon by parties.48 Parties that create contracts in
reliance on court rulings may have their expectations upended when a court
overturns those rulings. Conversely, in the area of antitrust law, “the general
presumption that legislative changes should be left to Congress has less force with
respect to the Sherman Act in light of the accepted view that Congress ‘expected the
courts to give shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on common-law
tradition.’”49
For the Court to overrule a precedent, and thus override stare decisis, it needs a
special justification. One such justification is an argument that the precedent’s
statutory and doctrinal underpinnings have eroded.50 When a statutory precedent is
overruled, the primary reason for the Court’s ruling is often the “intervening
development of the law, through either the growth of judicial doctrine or further
action taken by Congress,”51 or because “the later law has rendered the decision
irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies.”52 Another justification for

43.

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
Id. at 828 (citing Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)).
45.
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
46.
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014).
47.
See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989).
48.
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
49.
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1997) (citing National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)).
50.
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989).
51.
Id. (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480–81 (1989); see also
Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 406 U.S. 320, 321–22 (1972)).
52.
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989) (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Ct.
of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 497–499 (1973); Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542, 552 (1963)).
44.
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overriding stare decisis is that “a precedent may be a positive detriment to coherence
and consistency in the law . . . because of inherent confusion created by an
unworkable decision.”53
Despite these general principles of stare decisis serving as a basic framework, the
legal doctrine is “essentially indeterminate.”54 The Supreme Court’s characterization
of stare decisis as a flexible “principle of policy,”55 as well as the numerous
considerations that constitute the lengthy inquiry, have both served to confound this
doctrine and inspire “unusually scathing dissents” from Supreme Court Justices.56
One particular conflict within this doctrine is illustrated by the differences in the
Court’s description of stare decisis in two particular cases: Halliburton Co. v. Erica P.
John Fund, Inc.57 and Payne v. Tennessee.58 In Halliburton, the Court stated that it
requires “special justification, not just an argument that the precedent was wrongly
decided.”59 However, the Payne Court stated that “when governing decisions are
unworkable or are badly reasoned, this Court has never felt constrained to follow
precedent.”60
The confusion lies in whether “bad reasoning” is a “special justification.” It would
certainly seem that it is not so, because “if the precedent were correct on the merits,”
meaning the precedent was well reasoned, “the Court would reaffirm it without
regard to stare decisis.”61 This conflict is caused by the way courts treat stare decisis in
cases of statutory interpretation differently than other cases. Halliburton was a case
involving statutory interpretation, thus a “special justification” was necessary.62
C. The Supreme Court’s Ruling in Brulotte
In Brulotte v. Thys Co.,63 the Court considered whether a hop-picking machine patent
owner could continue to license his machines for royalty payments after the patents
on the machine had expired.64 Thys Company, an owner of various hop-picking
patents, sold machines to several others for a flat sum and issued a license for their

53.
Id. (citing Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47–48 (1977); Swift & Co. v.
Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 124–25 (1965)).
54.
Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis As Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411, 414 (2010).
55.
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940).
56.
Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis As Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411, 413-14 (2010).
57.
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
58.
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
59.
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014) (quotations omitted).
60.
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (quotations omitted). See also Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 315 (2010) (overruling a precedential case because it was not “well reasoned”).
61.
Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis As Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411, 417 (2010).
62.
Halliburton, 134 S.Ct. at 2407.
63.
379 U.S. 29 (1964).
64.
Id. at 29-30.
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use, under which there was “payable a minimum royalty of $500 for each hop-picking
season or $3.33 1/3 per 200 pounds of dried hops harvested by the machine,
whichever is greater.”65 Seven patents listed in the license were incorporated into the
machines, and all expired on or before 1957.66 However, the licenses issued continued
for terms beyond 1957.67 Thys Company brought suit when the licensees refused to
make further royalty payments.68
The Supreme Court ruled that a patent gives exclusive rights to the patentee to
make, sell, and use the article, but these rights become public property once the term
has ended.69 The Court relied on the Scott Paper reasoning that allowing a patentee to
continue his monopoly after the patent term expires runs counter to the purpose of
patent law and public policy.70 The Court concluded that “a patentee’s use of a royalty
agreement that projects beyond the expiration date of the patent is unlawful per se.”71
III. THE COURT’S REASONING

In Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, declining to overrule
Brulotte.72 The Court reasoned that the Brulotte ruling had a “superpowered form of
stare decisis” because it was a statutory interpretation involving property and contract
rights, and the Court was presented with no special justification for departing from
this rule. 73
The Court began by describing how it has decided cases involving the limiting of
the free use of patented inventions.74 A patent typically expires twenty years from the
day its application was filed for, and the Court “has carefully guarded that cut-off
date” by ruling that once an article’s patent expires, it is in the public domain and
may be freely made and sold.75 The Court explained the Brulotte rule as a continuation
of this trend; a contract that requires a party to pay royalties after the patent has
expired extends the patentee’s monopoly on the article beyond the patent period and
restricts the public domain’s free use of the article.76 The Court stated that the Brulotte

65.

Id.
Id. at 30.
67.
Id.
68.
Id.
69.
Id. at 31 (citing Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896); Kellogg Co. v. National
Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938)).
70.
Id. (citing Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945)).
71.
Id. at 32.
72.
Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015).
73.
Id. at 2410.
74.
Id. at 2407.
75.
Id.
76.
Id. at 2407-08.
66.
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ruling may prevent some parties from forming the exact deals they desire, but it only
bars royalties, so parties can find other ways to achieve the same ends.77
The Court next discussed the role of stare decisis in this case.78 The Court
characterized the principle as “a foundation stone of the rule of law.”79 The Court
stated that an argument that the Court made an incorrect decision is not enough to
persuade it to overturn a settled precedent; there must be a “special justification” over
and above the belief that the precedent was wrongly decided.80 Additionally, the
Court continued, stare decisis holds an even greater force in a case like Brulotte when
the Court interprets a statute, because such a ruling can be corrected by Congress.81
The Court determined that Brulotte’s precedential force is further strengthened by
the fact that Congress has spurned multiple opportunities to reverse it for over half a
century.82 Lastly, the Court stated that Brulotte is a contracts and property case, which
are two areas of law in which “considerations favoring stare decisis are ‘at their acme’”
because parties are likely to rely on rulings in these areas of law.83 The parties
disagreed whether Brulotte created any reliance (as there was no evidence presented
of any such licenses existing), but the Court ruled that “even uncertainty on this score
cuts in Marvel’s direction,” since there was “a reasonable possibility that parties have
structured their business transactions in light of Brulotte.”84
Once this high standard of stare decisis is established, the Court states that there
does not exist a “superspecial justification” to warrant overruling Brulotte.85 First, the
statutory and doctrinal underpinnings of Brulotte have not eroded over time.86 Scott
Paper, the case on which Brulotte relied, is still good law.87 Reversing Brulotte may
threaten other decisions, because of the decision’s “close relation to a whole web of
precedents,” and the Court would not like to “unsettle stable law.”88 Next, the Court
claims that Brulotte has not proved to be an unworkable case.89 The current rule is
easy to apply; the Court must only ask whether a licensing agreement provides
royalties after the patent has expired.90 This stands in contrast to the alternative rule

77.

Id. at 2408.
Id. at 2409.
79.
Id. (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2036 (2014)).
80.
Id. (citing Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2398, 2047 (2014)).
81.
Id.
82.
Id. at 2409-10.
83.
Id. at 2410 (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)).
84.
Id.
85.
Id.
86.
Id.
87.
Id.at 2411.
88.
Id.
89.
Id. (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–173,(1989) (identifying unworkability
as another “traditional justification” for overruling precedent)).
90.
Id.
78.
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that Kimble proposes in order to invalidate agreements that have anti-competitive
consequences: antitrust law’s rule of reason.91 This rule of reason is an “elaborate
inquiry” that “produces notoriously high litigation costs and unpredictable results.”92
Thus, Kimble’s proposed alternative would make the rule less workable, not more.93
The Court also addresses two more of Kimble’s justifications for overruling
Brulotte.94 Kimble first claims that Brulotte assumed that post-patent royalty
agreements are invariably anticompetitive, a mistaken view of the effects of such
arrangements.95 Kimble notes that these agreements more often increase competition
rather than inhibit it, and the Court does not see an error in this analysis.96 However,
the Court has two inquires on this claim: was Brulotte actually founded on this
analysis of competitive effects, and if so is this economic mistake suffice to overcome
Brulotte?97 The Court said that instead of on a competitive effects analysis, Brulotte
was actually founded on a bright-line rule that all patents and their benefits must end
when the patent expires.98 Regardless, the Court stated that even if Brulotte were based
on that economic mistake, that reason would not be enough to overcome stare decisis
in this case because Congress is the correct entity to fix that misjudgment, and Kimble
has not brought forth any changes in economic theory or new empirical studies that
have changed since the Brulotte rule.99
Kimble’s second claim is that the Brulotte rule damages the American economy by
discouraging technological innovation.100 Kimble argued that if parties are not free to
contract as they please, they may not reach an agreement at all, which may discourage
invention in the first place.101 The Court rejected this claim because Kimble offers no
empirical evidence that the Brulotte ruling has led to decreased innovation, and
because claims that a statutory precedent stifles innovation are more appropriate for
Congress.102
In Justice Alito’s dissent, with whom the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas joined,
he contended that Brulotte was based on a debunked economic theory, and that
“[s]tare decisis does not require [the Court] to retain this baseless and damaging
precedent.”103 The dissent claims that Brulotte was not actually about statutory
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id. (quoting Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc., 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
Id.
Id. at 2412
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2413.
Id.
Id. at 2414.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2415 (Alito, J. dissenting).
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interpretation at all because the Patent Act says nothing about post-expiration
royalties.104 Justice Alito asserts that “nothing in the text of the Act even arguably
forbids licensing agreements that provide for post-expiration royalties.”105 The
Brulotte ruling was based on policymaking, and bad policymaking at that, according
to Justice Alito.106 He states that the economic reasoning of Brulotte has been “soundly
refuted”; it incorrectly assumes that post-expiration royalties extend the monopoly
of the patent, but once the patent ends the ability to exclude is gone.107 The majority
claims that parties can find ways around Brulotte, but Alito claims the need to do this
is an economic inefficiency.108 Additionally, the majority claims that Brulotte creates
problems by upsetting parties’ expectations, because often both parties are unaware
of the rule.109 Marvel’s claim that the Brulotte ruling has generated reliance is not
supported, but the Court admits there is an uncertainty and gives Marvel the benefit
of the doubt.110 The dissent asserts that there is no uncertainty, and that what is known
for sure is that the Brulotte rule has often disrupted parties’ agreements.111
After breaking down the Brulotte ruling, and even stating that its “only virtue is
that [the Court] decided it,” the dissent claims that stare decisis does not prevent the
case from being overruled.112 Justice Alito points to Pearson v. Callahan,113 which states
that “[r]evisiting precedent is particularly appropriate where … a departure would
not upset expectations, the precedent consists of a judge-made rule ..., and experience
has pointed up the precedent’s shortcomings.”114 The dissent contends that stare
decisis does not require the Court to uphold Brulotte because its holding “had no basis
in the law,” “[i]ts reasoning has been thoroughly disproved,” “[i]t poses economic
barriers that stifle innovation,” and “it unsettles contractual expectations.”115 The
dissent believes that the Court may be more reluctant to overturn decisions
interpreting statutes, but the Brulotte ruling did not actually interpret a statute.116
Lastly, the dissent claims the Court places too much weight in the fact that Congress
did not act to fix the Brulotte rule, citing the reasoning of Girouard v. United States117

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

10

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2416.
Id.
Id. at 2417.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
Kimble, 135 S.Ct. at 2417 (Alito, J. dissenting) (citing Pearson, supra, note 113, at 233).
Id.
Id. at 2418.
328 U.S. 61 (1946).

Journal of Business & Technology Law Proxy

Roche PP v2 (Do Not Delete)

4/12/2017 10:10 AM

Austin Roche
that “[i]t is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of
a controlling rule of law.”118
IV. ANALYSIS

In Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, the United States Supreme Court declined
to overrule Brulotte v. Thys Co.119 The Court decided correctly by leaving the Brulotte
rule for Congress to fix, since it was a case of statutory interpretation, not
policymaking, and a case of patent law, not antitrust law.120 This ruling is not likely to
create a significant economic impact, but it may lead to Congressional action to
amend the Patent Act.121
A. The Court Decided Kimble Correctly by Giving Stare Decisis Proper Deference
Kimble was decided correctly, and the dissenting arguments lack merit. The crux of
the argument in Justice Alito’s dissent is that the Brulotte rule “was not based on
anything that can plausibly be regarded as an interpretation of the terms of the Patent
Act,” but rather was based on a now debunked economic theory.122 The dissent even
continues to say that “nothing in the text of the Act even arguably forbids licensing
agreements that provide for post-expiration royalties.”123 Based on the text of both
the Brulotte opinion and the Patent Act, both of these claims are false.
The Patent Act gives a patentee the right to exclude others from making, using, or
selling the patented article, and these rights are only granted during the twenty year
term.124 The Act does not explicitly forbid licensing agreements with post-expiration
royalties, but this consequence can be reasonably inferred. Such an agreement is a
way for a patentee to sell his exclusive rights to make, use or sell the article. When the
term ends, the patentee no longer has these exclusive rights because they pass to the
public. Thus, it can reasonably be concluded that a patentee should not be able to sell
rights that are no longer exclusive to him.
The dissent incorrectly believes that the Brulotte ruling was not an interpretation
of the Patent Act, but rather based on an economic theory.125 Justice Alito
characterizes Brulotte as “an antitrust decision masquerading as a patent case.”126 He
argues that the decision was “principally concerned with patentees improperly
118.
(1946)).
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Kimble, 135 S.Ct. at 2418 (Alito, J. dissenting) (citing Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69–70
Kimble, 135 S.Ct. at 2405.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
Kimble, 135 S.Ct. at 2415 (Alito, J. dissenting).
Id.
See supra Part II.A.
Kimble, 135 S.Ct. at 2415 (Alito, J. dissenting).
Id. at 2418.
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leveraging their monopoly power,” and that it “expressly characterized postexpiration royalties as anti-competitive tying arrangements.”127 While the Brulotte
ruling does indeed state these economic arguments, they are merely used in support
of the statutory interpretation reasoning.
Brulotte was in fact a ruling of statutory interpretation based on its discussion of
the text of the Patent Act and its reliance on the Scott Paper decision.128 After
examining the text of the Patent Act, the Brulotte Court stated that the patent rights
“become public property” once the term is over by relying on the text from the Scott
Paper decision which stated “any attempted reservation or continuation in the
patentee … after the patent expires, whatever the legal device employed, runs counter
to the policy and purpose of the patent laws.”129 This quote from Scott Paper is a clear
statutory interpretation because it relies on the “policy and purpose” of the Patent
Act. Furthermore, since the Brulotte ruling relied on Scott Paper, it is clear that
Brulotte was also a statutory interpretation. As the majority opinion in Kimble puts
it, “Brulotte did not undertake to assess that practice’s likely competitive effects.
Instead, it applied a categorical principle that all patents, and all benefits from them,
must end when their terms expire.”130 To say that Brulotte was merely “masquerading
as a patent case” is an incredibly unfair characterization based on these arguments.131
Perhaps the most damning evidence to the dissent’s argument is found in a
footnote to Justice Harlan’s Brulotte dissent: “it should not be overlooked that we are
dealing here with a patent, not an antitrust case.”132 Even the dissent in Brulotte was
firmly aware that the case was certainly a patent one. It is important to note that the
majority opinion is aware of how pivotal this characterization is; Justice Kagan writes
that “[i]f Brulotte were an antitrust rather than a patent case,” the Court might rule
in Kimble’s favor.133
The dissent’s subsequent arguments are rendered moot by the fact that Brulotte
was ruled on statutory interpretation. After making his assertion that Brulotte is based
on policymaking, Justice Alito goes on in his dissent to explain why such a policy is a
bad one and thus should be overturned.134 This argument is of no significance because
as Justice Kagan stated in the majority opinion, “the choice of what patent policy
should be lies first and foremost with Congress.”135 The dissent continues to state that
“we do not give super-duper protection to decisions that do not actually interpret a
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statute.”136 This argument is clearly moot in light of the fact that Brulotte was a
statutory interpretation, thus the “enhanced force” of stare decisis argued by the
majority still stands.137
B. The Kimble Ruling Will Not Have a Significant Economic Impact
The ruling here is not likely to have any significant economic impact; however, it may
eventually have an impact on patent law. The first effect is clear: a patentee may not
enforce a royalty provision in a licensing agreement once his patent has expired. This
ruling may prevent some parties from entering into the exact deals they require, but
as the majority opinion states, “parties can often find ways around Brulotte.”138 For
example, an agreement where a licensee defers payments for the use of a patent
during the patent period into the post-expiration period of the patent are still
allowed.139 Additionally, a post-expiration royalty is still allowed if it is tied to a nonpatent right.140 This means two parties can enter an agreement where a royalty for a
patent is paid during the patent period, and during the post patent period a royalty
is paid for a trade secret.141 The decision is also unlikely to upset any expectations of
parties who entered into post-patent royalty agreements, because Marvel was unable
to present any such examples and Kimble claimed no “meaningful number of [such]
license agreements ... actually exist.”142 While the Court did admit ignorance as to
whether such agreements exist, it seems unlikely that if neither side was able to find
any examples that this decision would create significant problems for existing
agreements.143
However, as Kimble contends and the Court does not refute, “a broad scholarly
consensus supports Kimble’s view of the [positive] competitive effects of postexpiration royalties.”144 While Kimble’s economic argument may not have had any
effect on the Court, it is plausible that this case will bring the attention of Congress
to this issue. After all, the Court explicitly stated that “[c]ritics of the Brulotte rule
must seek relief not from this Court but from Congress.”145
136.
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V. CONCLUSION

In Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC146, the issue presented to the Court was
whether it should overrule its decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co.147, which held that a
patentee cannot receive royalty payments after the term of the patent has expired.148
The court held that under stare decisis it must uphold the Brulotte ruling.149 The Court
ruled correctly by upholding a ruling on statutory interpretation that had been
unchanged by Congress for over half a century. The dissent’s inaccurate argument
that the Brulotte ruling was actually bad policymaking is not enough to overcome
stare decisis.
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